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Bell v. Commonwealth
563 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002)
LFaas
On October 29,1999, Edward Nathaniel Bell ("Bell"), a Jamaican national,
shot and killed Sergeant Ricky Lee Tmbrook (rTmibrook") of the Winchester
Police Department ("the department").1 Timbrook and two probation/parole
officers were making home visits to individuals on probation or parole. On the
sixth visit to one individual's home, the officers approached a man standing
between an apartment building and a dumpster. As they approached, Bell, who
had ducked into the shadows, ran from them. Tumbrook chased Bell, identified
himself as the police, and repeatedly ordered Bell to stop. Bell climbed over a
fence, and as Timbrook began to climb the fence, Bell shot Tmibrook in the
head, killing him.
Ajuryconvicted Bell of the capital murder of Timbrook' At the sentencing
hearing, the jury found the future dangerousness aggravator and fixed Bell's
sentence at death.4 Bell appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme

Court of Virginia.'
II. Hoding
The Supreme Court of Virginia found no error in the judgment of the
Carcuit Court of the Cityof Winchester and affirmed Bell's conviction and death
sentence

1. Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E2d 695,701-02 (Va. 2002).
2. Id
3. Id at 700;s&VA. ODE ANN. S 182-31(6) (Mchie Supp. 2002) (defining capital murder
as the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated lling of a la-enforcement officer as defined in S 9.1101 or anylaw-enforcement officer of another state or the United States having the power to arrest
for a felonyunder the laws of such state or the United States, when such killing is for the purpose
of interfering with the performance of his official duties"). The jury also found Bell guilty of the
use of a firearm in the commission of murder, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and
possession of a firearm while possessing cocaine. Bd4 563 SE.2d at 700 n.1
4. B 4 563 SJEE2d at 700-01; swVA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-2642 ( lfchie 2000) (setting forth
the conditions a jury must find prior to imposing the death penaly3.
5. Bd 563 S.2d at 701.
6. Id Bell made a number of assignments of error that are not addressed here. These issues
incude speedy trial, search of his vehicle, evidence of other suspects, evidence of Bell's prior
possession of a firearm, uniformed law-enforcement officers in the courtroom, evidence of
unadjudicated criminal conduct, evidence regarding execution procedure, constitutionality of the
death penalty as applied in Virginia, and statutory review. S id at 703-19.
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II.A nibsis /Appifim w Vi ma
A. Vienm
andw
Bell argued that the department violated his rights under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Article 36").! Bell alleged that his
rights were violated in the following three respects: (1)the police did not advise
him of his right to communicate with the Jamaican consulate; (2)he made his
statement to the police prior to being notified of the department's obligation to
notify his consulate; and (3)the department unreasonably delayed notifying his
consulate of his arrest The court found that Article 36 required the department
to inform Bell of his Article 36 rights and to notify his consulate of his arrest
"without delay."9 The department notified Bell of his consular rights shortly
after the police finished their questioning and thirtysix hours later a police
officer faxed a notification to the Consulate of Jamaica.° The court, noting that
Article 36 did not require im ediate consular notification, found that such a
delay did not violate Bell's rights under Article 36. Applying the reasoning of
Canoy qjRiwide v McLaWj 12 the court concluded that the thirty-six hour
delay in notifying the Jamaican consulate was reasonable."
Under Bd, in order for a defendant to establish a violation of Article 36, he
must show that the police unreasonably delayed notifying his consulate of his
arrest.' 4 The court found that the forty-eight hour "rule" of Coty qRiweside
satisfied the reasonableness requirement."5 Thus, a defendant mayhave a legitimate claim if the delay is longer than this presumptively reasonable time frame.
In addition, the court interpreted the language "without delay" in Article 36 to
mean that a defendant maybe questioned prior to his16notification of his Article
36 rights or his consulate's notification of his arrest.

7. It at 705. SewgmuVienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24,1963, art. 36,
21 US.T. 77, 100-01 (hereinafter ViEmz Cbmwu&.
8. Bd4 563 S.E2d at 706; se Vima G=&ti
s"a note 7, art. 36,21 U.S.T. 77, 101.
9. Bd4 563 S.E2d at 706; see Vie= Cmundckm swra note 7, at. 36,21 US.T. 77, 101.
10. Bd, 563 S.E2d at 705-06; se Via= Comdorw s"p note 7, art. 36,21 US.T. 77, 101.
11. Bd, 563 S.E.2d at 706; see Vier Onimna, sqm note 7, art. 36,21 US.T. 77,101.

12.

500 US.44 (1991).

13.

BdA, 563 S.E2d at 706; se County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 US. 44, 56 (1991)

(holding that a probable cause finding made within fortyeight hours of a 'warrantless arrest is
effectively presumed to, meet the promptness requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
14. Bd, 563 S.E.2d at 706; see Viem Cenwymni s"pra note 7, art. 36,21 US.T. 77, 100-01.

15.

Bdal
563 SE.2d at 706; see aso Coo*a qRimside 500 US. at 56.

16. Bd, 563 SE.2d at 706; see Viem Comma.i stam note 7, art. 36,21 US.T. 77,101. In
extensive dictum, the court also addressed the remedies for aviolation of Article 36. SeBd!, 563

S.E.2d. at 706-07.
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B. Grv iJwy

Bell further claimed that the circuit court should have dismissed his indictment because the grand jurywas exposed to prejudicial information. Information about Tunbrook's death and the creation of a scholarship fund for his
unborn child was posted on fliers on the doors of the courthouse." Bell claimed
that the grand jurors could not have entered the courthouse without seeing one
of these fliers.19 The court found that the effect of the fliers on the grand jurors
was "pure speculation."20 Thus, the court found no error because the finding of
probable cause at the preliminary hearing and Bell's conviction at trial demonstrated that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, that there
was probable cause to indict him. 1
In effect, the court made objections to the indictment, based upon defects
in the grand jury, impossible to prove.2 Moreover, the court adopted the rule
applied in federal cases. 3 Uni xs v MavikZ' sets out the federal rule." A
defendant appealing his conviction on the ground that there were defects in the
grand juryproceeding alreadyhas been proven guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt.
Under Meiwi, this finding of guilt demonstrates that there was probable cause
26
to indict the defendant, and thus anydefect in the grand juryis harmless error.
C iwy Sdewmn / VcxD e Q ,t5m

Bell claimed that the circuit court erred bydenying his motion to strike juror
Golding for causeY' Juror Golding subsequently was excused from jury duty
because she could not arrange for child care. The court found that because Bell

17.

B4 563 S.E2d at 708.

18.
19.
20.

Id
Id

21.
22.

Id at 708 (citing United States v. Mechanlk, 475 US. 66, 70 (1986)).
SwVA. ODE ANN. S 192-192 (Vichie 2000) (requiring members of a grand juryto keep

Id

secret "al proceedings which occurred during sessions of the grand y"). Whileitisnotclearthat
Section 192-192 applies to this case, it does apply to most grand jury proceedings.
23. Bd, 563 SX.2d at 708; seeUnired States v. Mlechanik 475 US. 66,72-73 (1986) (holding
that a "jurys verdict of guilty. .. demonstrates ... that there was probable cause to charge the
defendants with the offenses for which they wre convicted," thus rendering alleged prosecutorial
misconduct before the grand jury harmless).
24.
25.

475 US. 66 (1986).
Me vAil,475 US. at 72-73.

26.
27.
28.

Id
M4 563 SE.2d at 709.
Id
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failed to object to the court's denial of his motion, the assignment of error was

mooted.2 ' In addition, the court found that several of Bell's assignments of error
regarding voir dire also were procedurally defaulted due to his failure to object
at the time of the alleged error.'
The court first noted that Bell does not have a constitutional right to

individual voir dire. 1 The court held that the circuit court's refusal to allow

individual voir dire was not an error because the circuit court permitted extensive

questioning of the potential jurors.32 Next, Bell contended that seven jurors were
improperly rehabilitated." Bell failed to object to the seating of five of the seven
jurors, thus waiving any claim on appeal regarding these jurors. 4 Bell did not
allege that the court's decision to strike the remaining two jurors for cause was
erroneous. Instead, he claimed that the court asked leading questions during the
voir dire of these jurors. The court found no error because it concluded that
the circuit court's questioning was not improper and because Bell did not object

to the circuit court's questioning during the voir dire of these two jurors.36
Finally, Bell alleged that the circuit court ened by sustaining the Commonwealth's objections to four of his questions." These questions dealt with the
death penalty, presumption of innocence, and presentation of evidence.3" The
court concluded that potential jurors would be confused bythese questions and
that they would force the jurors to speculate.3 The court found no error in the
circuit court's decision to sustain the Commonwealth's objections.'o
In light of CammuwIM v H!," the court may need to reexamine its
conclusion that a defendant has no right to an individual voir dire. 2 In Hi/,a
non-capital case, the court concluded that "neither the defendant nor the Commonwealth has a constitutional or statutory right to question a jury panel about

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id

36.
37.
38.

Id
Id

Id at 711.
Id (citing Qaerrix v. Commonwealth, 513 SE.2d 642,647 (Va. 1999)).

Id
Bd4 563 S.E.2d at 711.

Id
Id

Id

39.

Bd, 563 S.E2d at 711.

40.

Id

41. 568 S.E.2d 673 (Va. 2002).
42.
Commonweath v. HIA, 568 S.E.2d 673, 676 (Va. 2002) (stating that "neither the
defendant nor the Cmmonweakh has a constitutional or statutory right to question a jurypanel
about the range of punishment that may be imposed upon the defendant").
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the range of punishment that maybe imposed upon the defendant."43 However,
the Hil court reaffirmed the holding of Gmn v CQwm==(zt," that juror views
on the death penalty are relevant to bias and impartiality in capital cases.45 The
court in Hillnoted that capital cases are "qualitativelydifferent" fromnon-capital
cases.' This language clearlyrecognizes the need for greater procedural protection for capital defendants. One procedure which will help insure increased
fairness and accuracy in capital cases is individual voir dire.
Bell lost a number of his claims of error due to his failure to object to the
errors at the time that theyoccurred. 47 Bell's counsel remained silent through the
seating of objectionable jurors and through a line of questions bythe Commonwealth that he later alleged was leading." These lost assignments of error
reemphasize the importance of recognizing error, objecting at the moment that
it occurs, and requesting the proper remedy in order to avoid procedurally
defaulting these claims.
D. Radal Cwar dw qfVeow
Bell argued that the circuit court should have struck the jury array and
impaneled a new venire because there were onlytwo black individuals in the fiftyperson venire.49 The black population of Winchester is 10.5% of the total
population.' He alleged that this difference constituted a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right "to select a jury from a representative cross-section of the
community. " " The circuit court denied Bell's motion on the ground that he
failed to show a systematic exclusion of black individuals from the venire. 2 The
Supreme Court of Virginia agreed and stated that in order to establish a constitutional violation of the defendant's right to a fair jury selection system, the defendant must show a systematic exclusion of a "distinctive group in the communiy"53

43.
44.

Id
546 S.E2d 446 (Va. 2001).

45. Hid,568 S.E2d at 676; se Green v. Commonwealth, 546 S.E.2d 446, 452 (Va. 2001)
(stating that "courts should be mindful that if anyreasonable doubt exists regading whetherajur
stands indifferent in the cause, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant").

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

51.
52.
53.
1989)).

Hi/i,
568 S.E.2d at 676.
B4I 563 S.E2d at 703-04.
Id at 711.
Idat 712.
Id

Id
Id
BK 563 S1..2d at 712 (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 50, 53 (Va.
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The court requires a defendant to show that the system of jury selection
systematically excludes a distinct group of people. ' In Carinv Cbrmrma1W., s
the court concluded that a defendant must put on evidence of the jury commission's selection process and its flaws in order to challenge a jury list under
Section 8.01-345 of the Virginia Code.-' Without such evidence, the court
presumes the list to be proper."7 The evidentiary requirements set forth in Be
and Cobin make a successful challenge to a venire nearly impossible.
E. Appdm t Expeit to Tapi R dig C m
Cafimmt
Bell claimed that the circuit court should have granted his motion for
appointment of a correctional specialist as an expert to provide testimony
regarding the conditions of confinement that would be imposed on Bell if he
were to be sentenced to life imprisonment."s Bell alleged that the jury needed
such information in order to assess the likelihood that Bell would pose a future
danger in prison. 9 The court has rejected this type of evidence in the past, but
Bell argued that the issue should be reexamined because decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia are in conflict with decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and because trial courts throughout Virginia have inconsistently
naV h,60 and Cexn t CainMWad&.61
applied Burns v
Bell argued that a string of United States Supreme Court cases recognized
that "m anyinm ates who would be dangerous if released are not dangerous when
confined to the 'structured environment' of prison."' The Supreme Court of
54.
55.

Id
564 S.E2d 147 (Va. O. App. 2002).

56. Corbin v. Commonwealth, 564 SE.2d 147, 149 (Va. 0. App. 2002) (stating that the
burden was on the defendant to prove his allegation that the jury commissioners "failed to follow
the statutory selection process"); sre VA. CODE ANN. S8.01-345 (1ichie 2000).
57. CoW6 564 S.E2d at 149.
58. Bd4 563 S.E2d at 713.
59. Id
60.

541 S.E2d 872 (Va. 2001).

61. SwgwnUyBums v. Commonwealth, 541 S.Ed 872 (Va. 2001) (stating that evidence
of the nature of prison life is not relevant to a jury's future dangerousness inquiry); Cherrix v.
Commonweath, 513 S.E2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999) (stating that 'what a person mayexpect in the
penal system' is not relevant mitigation evidence").
62. Bd/, 563 S.E.2d at 713-14. Seegna/!yWiliams v. Tayr, 529 US. 362 (2000) (finding
that defense counsel's failure to present miigating evidence at the sentencing hearing constituted

ineffective assistance); Sinmons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154 (1994) (holding that when the
future dangerousness aggravator is at issue, due process requires a court to inform a jury at
sentencing that alife sentence means life without parole if the defendant would be parole ineligible);
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 US. 1, 7 (1986) (finding that the state court erred by excluding

relevant mitigating evidence because the exclusion "impeded the sentencing jury's abilityto carry
out its task of considering all relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender").
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Virginia found that the cases cited by Bell stand for a defendant's right at sentencing to present evidence that is relevant to the jury's future dangerousness
inquy. A defendant may present evidence of his character, history, and
background." The court reiterated its holding in Bum, stating that "[e]vidence
regarding the general nature of prison life in a maximum security facility is not
relevant to that inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of future
dangerousness." 6" The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that its decisions
in Burm and Cbam are not inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's
decisions on this issue."
F. Jlry QuhR n
qio

EaiyRdase

During the jury's penaltyphase deliberations, the jury asked, "Understanding that imprisonment for life means no possibility of parole, is there any other
wayto be released from prison?" 67 The circuit court originallyplanned to inform
the jurythat there were no other means of release for a defendant who has been
convicted of capital murder." The Commonwealth objected to this proposed
answer on the ground that adefendant could be released byexecutive clemency.69
The court agreed.70 Because the court believed that a completelytruthful answer
to the jury's question, which addressed the Commonwealth's concern, would
have allowed the juryto consider "speculative and inappropriate"matters, it told
the jury that it "would have to rely on the evidence that they [sic] heard and the
instructions already presented in deciding the punishment.""'
Bell claimed that this answer left the jury speculating about whether he
might be released at some time in the fiture!2 He alleged that this unresolved
speculation may have caused the juryto impose death rather than life imprisonment. Bell argued that his death sentence was imposed in violation of Virginia
law, his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and his Eighth
Amendment rights to a fair and reliable sentencing determination.7 4 Relying
63.
64.

Bd 563 S.E2d at 714.

65.

Id
Id (quoting Bwa , 541 S.E.2d at 893).

66.
67.

Id; seeBwm, 541 S.E2d at 872; Chmix, 513 S.E2d at 642.
B4 563 S.E.2d at 716.

68.

Id

69.

Id

70.
71.
72.

Id
Id
Id

73.74.

Be!4 563 S.E2d at 716.
Id; seeSirrnms, 512 US. at 164; Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602,616 (Va.

1999) (holding that a defendant who has been convicted of capital murder has a right to have his
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heavily on Fishbak v Cairnuai1d,,"sthe court concluded that the circuit court's
instructions were correct and that its decision not to inform the jury of the
availability of executive pardon and clemency was also correct.76
The court reasoned that instructing the jury on the possibility of executive
pardon or clemency would have allowed speculation that might have resulted in
a harsher punishment than the jury otherwise would have given.' In addition,
the court noted that an instruction that addressed Bell's ineligibility for geriatric
release or sentencing credits and ordered the jury not to concern itself with
anything else would leave the jury speculating as to what other possibilities for
release existed. 8 The court concluded that the instruction given by the circuit
court was the only instruction that was accurate and did not leave the jury
speculating on whether the defendant might be released through other means.'
In Dins v C,80
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
Commonwealth's attorney acted improperlywhen he argued to the jury that the
defendant should be given the death penalty because it was easy to obtain a
pardon.8' The court emphatically stated that such arguments were unjustifiable
and could not be tolerated.82 If the court in Bd had given the jury an answer that
included the possibility of executive pardon or clemency, the Commonwealth's
attorney might have been able to avoid the prohibition of DiW and argue this
instruction to the jury. The Commonwealth's attorney would have had an
opportunity to argue to the jury that the defendant maybe released if he is not
sentenced to death.
Kdy u StAh Qmiim,8 3 and its predecessor Sinnm v Sutah Qmrd , held
that a jury must be informed of a defendant's parole ineligibility when future
sentencing jury informed that life imprisonment means life without parole).
75. 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000).
76. Bd, 563 S.E2d at 718; see Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000)
(holding that jries should be instructed on the abolition of parole for non-capital felony offenses
committed after January 1, 1995). Using the analysis of Fibak,a jury should be informed if a
defendant is eligible for geriatric release, but when a defendant is not eligible for geriatric release,
the juryneed onlybe informed of his parole ineligibility. Bd, 563 S.E.2d at 717 (citing F&ihlak, 532
S.E2d at 634).
77. Bd, 563 S.E2d at 718.
78. Id
79. Id
80. 149 S.E. 414 (1929).
81. Dingus v. Commonwealth, 149 SE. 414, 415 (1929) (concluding that the Commonwealth's attorney erred by arguing to the jury that the defendant should be given the death penalty
because of the likelihood that he would receive a pardon). The Commonwealth's attorney said to
the jury, 'Give him the death penalty. What does life imprisonment mean to a criminal with pardon
so easy;" Id

82.

Id

83.

534 U.S. 246 (2002).
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dangerousness is at issue." In Si/n , the United States Supreme Court noted
that,
ejury reasonably may have believed that petitioner could be reas on parole if he were not executed. To the extent this misunderstandi" pervaded the jurys delerations, i had the effect of creating
a false M ice between sentencing petitioner
to death and sentencing
him to a limited period of incarceration."5
This case nicelyposits the dilemma created byDil and Fishbhxk on one hand
and Yxhwuto, Section 19.2-264.4(A), and the Simi line of cases on the
other. 6 Once a Simi instruction has been given, a jury question asking for
more information about the defendant's possible release can only be fully and

truthfully answered by reference to clemency.87 But, the reference to clemency
might tip the scales toward death.
The judge probablyshould have re-instructed the juryvery specificallythat
there is no form of parole available to an individual convicted of capital murder.
A more specific response would be preferable, but the judge correctly avoided
the clemency issue. The suggested response is accurate and truthful, and best
protects the defendant because itdoes not specificallyaddress the clemencyissue.
In Bd, the judge faced a complex issue. 8 He gave an answer that balanced the
interests of the defendant and the Commonwealth.
Kristen F. Grunewald

84. See Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002) (holding that the Sbmm instruction is
mandatory when future dangerousness is at issue); Sinnr, 512 US. at 156 (1994).
85. Svirm, 512 U.S. at 161.
86. SeVA. CODE ANN.S 19.2-264.4(A) (Michie 2000 stating that adefendant may request
that the sentencing jury be instructed that a sentence of life imprisonment means life wtou
parole); YKdi 534 US. at 246; Sim=, 512 US. at 154; Fisha&z, 532 S.E.2d at 629; Yarbano,519
S.E2d at 602; DW, 149 S.E. at 414.
87. SeBd, 563 SE.2d at 716.
88. See id at 695.

